There are few weapons in the world that are more useful unused. What many people don’t realize is that nuclear weapons are most efficient when they remain in the silos. Nuclear weapons provide mobility, leverage and negotiating power. While we tend to focus on their catastrophic physical and psychological repercussions, their real use lies in deterrence and intimidation.
President of Russia Vladimir Putin has threatened the use of nuclear weapons time and time again during the conflict in Ukraine. Quite successfully, he has limited NATO involvement and generated fear and anxiety in the West. His erratic behavior and strong nuclear posturing leads to a credible nuclear threat. However, people must remember one key facet of the global nuclear order that has led to over seven decades of relative nuclear peace: deterrence.
Both Russia and the U.S. possess the ability to destroy each other and the world with their nuclear arsenal. The prevention of this nuclear apocalypse occurs from each side’s belief that they can withstand a first strike and sufficiently decimate their adversary in a second strike. Neither side wants to make the first move, and thus a standstill occurs — known as a deterrence. There is minimal advantage in acting first, particularly in a world where information is shared within a second, and public opinion remains staunchly against the use of nuclear weapons.
But in Ukraine, Putin cannot and will not use nuclear weapons. Doing so might gain him credibility, but it would also endanger the remaining delicate diplomatic ties he still has, likely resulting in massive nuclear retaliation from the West. Putin does not want nuclear war; he wants this conflict to remain inside the borders of Ukraine and to continue to limit NATO involvement in pursuit of some kind of limited victory, perhaps maintaining control of the Donbas region. When Putin started the war, he vastly underestimated Ukrainian resolve and Western economic support while overestimating the motivation of his own troops. His nuclear threats are simply a Band-Aid over the gaping bullet wound in his political and military campaign. What little leverage remains lies in his possession of the largest nuclear arsenal on the planet.
There is an argument that Putin would utilize his nuclear arsenal in order to ensure victory or to prevent an existential threat. If he wants to turn the tide and gain a decisive victory that hands him the territory he seeks, nuclear weapons may be his best option (much like how the U.S. utilized the bomb in Hiroshima and Nagasaki).
But this feels unlikely. The use of tactical nuclear weapons, or on the battlefield in a counterforce situation — used to target troops, resources or supplies — seems improbable. Ukrainian troops are too mobile and agile; they do not congregate, and they have distinct environmental and landscape advantages. Russian troops are also poorly trained. In order to use a tactical nuclear weapon, the target must be secure. In addition to enough Ukrainian troops being in the same place, Putin’s own forces would need to be out of harm's way if he were to deploy the weapon, making its use all the more unlikely.
Additionally, the use of a strategy in a countervalue setting (“targeting what the enemy holds dear”) is even more improbable. There is a lack of strong countervalue targets in Ukraine. The nuclear destruction of Kyiv or other cultural sites would likely engender a response from the U.S. and its Western allies. In my opinion, Putin does not desire this outcome. He wants a regional conflict: a territorial dispute to take back what he believes to be part of Russia. It would be a catastrophic miscalculation — and potentially politically suicidal — to embroil the rest of the world in a conflict that he may no longer be willing or able to succeed in.
Putin’s options are few because of the diplomatic guardrails that constrain him, but nuclear leverage remains useful, provided that he continues to posture and not use the weapons themselves. This threat is more effective than the detonation of the weapon. Putin is a political actor — he is not a trained military officer. He is surrounded by informed officials who know the realities of the global nuclear order and realize the advantages that simple threats maintain. So sleep peacefully, knowing deterrence is intact, and that the world’s biggest nuclear bully is all fire and no fury.
