From Midd to the Mideast: The difference between could and should

Over the past number of weeks, there has been a flurry of rhetorical posturing on all sides of the table.

Israeli Barak has reiterated his new favorite line about how Israel must end the Occupation for the sake of its future as a Jewish and democratic state (absolutely correct). American Barack has reportedly been mulling the possibility of putting an American peace proposal on the table (interesting idea). Bibi Netanyahu has been jabbering about how he wants peace, and how he will not compromise on Jerusalem (painfully contradictory).

Meanwhile, Israeli and Syrian ministers threatened to send each other’s countries back to “stone age” and “prehistoric” times, respectively — forced national time travel has recently become a popular trend in the Middle East. And so the story goes, augmented by disturbing Hamas cartoons, far-Right Israeli groups marching through the already volatile East Jerusalem and the ever-looming Iranian threat.

The peace process remains stalled, but Mideast special envoy George Mitchell is scuttling around the region, once again. Moreover, Obama, riding his health care wave and still largely unconsumed by the approaching midterm elections, is presumably quite ready to get things going.

I am going to dedicate the remainder of this to writing about two areas, the much talked about Jerusalem and the problematically undertalked-about Gaza strip — what could happen and what should happen in both cases.

The Jerusalem Controversy

Could happen: Netanyahu and Obama, through behind-the-scene talks and deals (perhaps involving sanctions on Iran) resolve the Jerusalem dispute, Israeli construction in East Jerusalem is frozen de facto and Jerusalem is “put on hold” as talks are restarted.

Or: The Netanyahu-Obama spat over Jerusalem continues to foment. Netanyahu decides to flex his political muscle and orders renewed construction in areas of Jerusalem such as Ramat Shlomo, counting on his domestic constituency to support policies on Jerusalem construction, even when they contravene the demands of Israel’s biggest ally and work against the prospects for peace.

Should happen: Netanyahu should realize, as President Obama said, that Israel’s future is jeopardized by the lack of an independent Palestine, and that an independent Palestine’s capital must be in East Jerusalem. He should therefore decide to reform his coalition, getting rid of the hard line parties like Shas and Yisrael Beitenu and inviting in the more pragmatic Kadima, in an effort to form a governing coalition that will allow him enough room to compromise on Jerusalem.

Hamas, Shalit and Gaza

Could happen: In line with their recent lean towards moderation and political legitimacy (exemplified by their decision to coerce other militant groups in Gaza into a cease-fire against Israel), Hamas accepts an Israeli offer to swap Gilad Shalit for a given amount of Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli jails (the cartoon Hamas produced on the subject, no matter how incendiary, will likely have no real political effect). Shalit’s release could have dramatic consequences: in return Israel could ease or even end its blockade on Gaza, and the potential for Hamas-Fatah rapprochment would increase decidedly.

Or: Shalit negotiations make no progress, the blockade remains in place, and Hamas ups the volatility of their rhetoric. A resumption of large-scale violence is unlikely in the near future, but violent words in the Middle East can often set off the spiral towards violent action.

Should happen: Israel should make all efforts possible to free Shalit. It should also, regardless of the status of prisoner negotiations, lift the blockade on Gaza. It is currently doing little more than denying Palestinians in Gaza certain basic commodities and strengthening Hamas’ rule over Gaza by giving Hamas a truly oppressive scapegoat to divert Gazans’ fury away from Hamas’ own brand of oppression. Moreover, Hamas must be recognized as a permanent actor in the theater of Israeli and Palestinian affairs. As such, Hamas must be engaged in some capacity if and when peace talks resume, however distasteful the prospect of engaging a group whose charter is full of violent, hateful rhetoric and anti-Semitism might be.

Hamas’ participation in the process is imperative for lasting peace, and deradicalization could come as a direct result of political inclusion. In all likelihood, Hamas’ Islamism is, for the majority of its supporters, more a vehicle for political protest than for religious dogmatism, and as such it must be recalled that the PLO was equally vitriolic in its call for Israel’s destruction prior to its inclusion in the Oslo peace process, but by 1993, had taken a virtual 180 on such positions.

Note: After writing this piece, Prime Minister Netanyahu issued a statement saying that he “is willing to discuss core issues of the conflict, namely Jerusalem, borders and security arrangements, as part of proximity talks with the Palestinian Authority.” Moreover, a report was issued stating that that there has indeed been a de facto construction freeze in contested areas of Jerusalem. And so it begins?