Beyond the Bubble - 03/18/10

On March 13, a suicide attack in Pakistan killed 13 people and injured dozens. A spokesman for Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan claimed that his organization was responsible for the attack.

In his statement, the spokesman condemned the Pakistani government for becoming “a colony of Blackwater,” referring to the contract agency employed by the American government that provided security to U.S. officials in Iraq. He continued, “the government of Pakistan has become a puppet of the U.S.,” and warned that unless strikes against the Taliban cease, there will be more attacks. Using the popular fear-mongering rhetoric, he declared, “our 2,000 suicide bombers, who have already spread across the country, will act against security personnel and government installations.”

While these statements are of concern, what is more interesting to note is the validity behind them.

A New York Times article noted that the U.S. government has recently pledged a further $55 million to upgrade roads in the struggling nation. In return for this “aid” the article reported that “the Obama administration would like the Pakistani military to pursue a full-scale offensive in North Waziristan against the Afghan Taliban.” The U.S. government believes that that the area is used for Taliban operations against American and NATO forces in Afghanistan.

Although Pakistan only permits the U.S. military to cross its borders by proxy using drones, the policies of the Obama administration seems to be inching closer toward infringing upon the sovereignty of the state. During a March 2009 foreign policy briefing, the President noted that “our strategy focuses more intensively on Pakistan than in the past, calling for more significant increases in U.S. and international support, both economic and military, linked to Pakistani performance against terror.”

While this sounds admirable, lurking behind Obama’s optimistic declaration is the unavoidable breach of the authoritative capacity of the Pakistani government. By involving itself in the governmental, military and economic affairs of the nation, the American government walks a thin line between being friend and foe to Pakistanis.

While converging on some matters of national security, the Pakistani and American governments have decidedly different agendas in the Taliban conflict. The American government has pushed for strategic military objectives that would improve the chances of the U.S. military success in Afghanistan.

In contrast, however, chief of the Pakistani army, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, has clearly indicated that Pakistan’s number one enemy is India.

Does the Obama administration have the right to use aid to pressure the Pakistani government? If so, should the U.S. priorities succeed those of the Pakistani government because of the financial support being provided?

And finally, if the American government is successful in pressuring the Pakistani military into the implementation of its agenda, then who is ultimately responsible for the consequences of the military initiatives? Military operations often fail, and when they do, blame is accorded. In this bilateral initiative has the line been drawn clearly enough between where the arm of the American government ends and the Pakistani government begins?